22 May 1959

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BUILLETIN



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
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Soviet Spokesmen Urge Secret Talks at Geneva

In both public statements and private talks, Soviet spokesmen at Geneva are stressing that the time has come for serious private negotiations to seek common ground for compromise agreements on the most important issues. In his formal speech on 18 May, Foreign Minister Gromyko underscored his readiness to consider Berlin and European security as separate and independent subjects for negotiation.

foreign ministers should get down 25X1 to secret sessions now that both sides have introduced their formal ''package' proposals. He suggested there should be private talks aimed at working out a framework for arrangements on Berlin and cessation of nuclear tests which could be "approved" at a summit meeting. He repeated earlier remarks that Khrushchev would expect to discuss other matters, including the Middle East and the Far East, at a summit conference, particularly in private talks with President Eisenhower.

These statements reflect both the USSR's constant probing for differences among the Western powers and its desire to create an impression of progress toward agreement on key issues which can be used to justify a heads-of-government meeting.

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Anglo-Soviet Trade Negotiations

Britain's official trade mission which arrived in Moscow on 12 May is having an "unexpectedly difficult" time with Soviet negotiators, according to British Ambassador Sir Patrick Reilly. At the beginning of the negotiations the USSR requested a large amount of direct government credits. It is most insistent now, however, that Britain grant it most-favored-nation treatment in regard to British import quotas. This in effect would expand the market for a wide variety of Soviet goods, earnings from which would enable Moscow to step up purchases of British machinery and chemical equipment.

British officials say that these demands are out of the question and that London is interested only in a moderate increase in trade--possibly raising British imports of Soviet timber, grain, and furs by some \$50,000,000, roughly equal to the USSR's favorable trade balance with the UK in its best year. This would enable the USSR to purchase more machinery in the sterling area. Additional purchases might be financed by government-guaranteed five-year credits to British exporters.

London apparently believes that some such official trade agreement will be reached. The British delegation thinks the USSR is employing its usual tactics of exaggerating trade possibilities but will finally settle for an agreement of much more modest proportions.

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